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Abstract
We study a (k,m)-threshold controlling scheme for con-
trolled quantum teleportation. A standard polynomial
coding over GF(p) with prime p > m−1 needs to distribute
a d-dimensional qudit with d ≥ p to each controller for
this purpose. We propose a scheme using m qubits (two-
dimensional qudits) for the controllers’ portion, following a
discussion on the benefit of a quantum control in compari-
son to a classical control of a quantum teleportation.
Keywords: Quantum teleportation, Threshold scheme,
Secret sharing
PACS: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn
1 Introduction
Quantum teleportation [1] has been one of the leading dis-
coveries followed by numerous quantum information pro-
cessing technologies [2, 3]. Controlled quantum teleporta-
tion [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] is a variant in which a teleportation of
a quantum state is performed under the supervision of con-
trollers. Schemes using qubits as keys distributed among
controllers [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] have been extensively studied and
economization of required resources has been accomplished
with respect to the number of qubits involved in an entan-
gled qubit chain used in a scheme. The studies also include
a security discussion on players’ cheating controllers [9].
It is expected that a multifunctional quantum network is
realized for a consumer market in future, presumably based
on optical fibers. So far, simple quantum cryptosystems
[10, 11] are highly developed [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] to-
ward the consumer use, which are mainly used to generate
classical shared cryptographic keys. An advanced quantum
network should be used not only for generating a classical
key but for exchanging quantum states. A network with
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs as links [18] is a plau-
sible form for this purpose; optical quantum teleportation
has already become a well-established subject supported by
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many experimental demonstrations reported in, e.g., Refs.
[19, 20, 21]. Considering an application for office networks,
it is demanded that data transfers can be under the control
of multiple supervisors. Controlled teleportation schemes
have been developed to enable this feature. As the number
of usable qubits and the quality of entanglement enhances,
this function is approaching reality. A function like a vote to
permit a transfer is also considered to be of public demand.
Qubit keys are commonly used in controlled quantum tele-
portation schemes for the basic control such that approvals
of all the controllers are required to let the players transfer
a quantum state. In such a control, use of qubit keys is suf-
ficient and extending each dimension of a quantum system
for a key causes a redundancy. Qudits (d-dimensional quan-
tum systems) with d > 2 have been, in contrast, considered
to be useful as keys when a vote for decision is in order.
It is easy to notice that such functions are enabled by
using a threshold scheme [22, 23, 24, 25, 26]: controlling
a transfer of a quantum state with a certain threshold in
the number of controllers is implemented by secret sharing
schemes (see, e.g., a discussion in Ref. [27]). This catego-
rizes controlled quantum teleportation as a combination of
quantum secret sharing and quantum teleportation. A well-
known polynomial coding [23, 26] over GF(p) with prime p
larger than the number m of participants (controllers in our
context) is a quick solution1. A classical or quantum (k,m)-
threshold scheme applied to a shared state of players and
controllers enables a control such that a receiver can recover
an original state when and only when k or more controllers
among m provide their keys. There is a variant of quan-
tum polynomial coding robust against a certain number of
cheaters among participants [28].
A drawback to introduce a polynomial coding scheme in
controlled quantum teleportation is that computation is con-
ducted over the field GF(p). Thus each qudit distributed
among controllers should have the dimension d ≥ p. This
also complicates a quantum circuit to compute a matrix
equation for the coding. For a threshold scheme, i.e., a
secret sharing without imposing access structure2, the di-
1Note that p can be equal to m if m is prime in the context of
controlled quantum teleportation (See Sec. 3).
2 See, e.g., Ref. [29] and citations therein for secret sharing schemes
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mension of each key (share) using best known classical pro-
tocols [30, 31] is O(2m) (namely, O(m) bits for each key)
for a long secret. These protocols require the bit length of
a secret O(m) and that of a key at least as much as the
length of a secret. For a short secret, a best known classical
protocol is Shamir’s one [23] in which each key has the di-
mension ≥ p > m. It is thus not motivating to simply make
a quantum extension of the classical protocols.
It was reported that an (m,m)-threshold secret sharing
of a classical secret is achieved by a sort of key distribu-
tion without entanglement [32] and an (m,m)-threshold con-
trolled quantum teleportation is achieved by using classical
keys [33]. The latter one is easily extended to a (k,m)-
threshold controlling scheme. Nevertheless, schemes using
qudits for controllers’ portion are more secure than the one
using only classical keys as we will discuss in Sec. 4.1. There
is a recently-proposed graph-state formalism [34] to produce
quantum secret sharing systems using only qubits. This ap-
proach has achieved the systems for several particular (k,m)
and not for general (k,m). We will construct a scheme which
is not a direct extension of these approaches.
In this paper, we introduce a (k,m)-threshold controlled
quantum teleportation scheme over GF(p) with prime p >
m−1 using m qubits for the controllers’ portion in addition
to classical information distributed to the controllers. This
is achieved by a hybrid of classical and quantum protocols.
It enables a reduction in the dimension of each qudit to
two for general (k,m), which is a significant improvement
for realizing the scheme. In contrast to classical systems,
the dimension of a quantum system is limited and usually a
large-dimensional qudit is implemented by multiple qubits.
The size of a qudit register is also very limited in the present
technology. The number of available qubits is, so far, twelve
or less [35].
To begin with, a standard controlled quantum telepor-
tation scheme is briefly described in Sec. 2. On the basis
of the scheme, a (k,m)-threshold controlled quantum tele-
portation using a polynomial coding is briefly explained in
Sec. 3. A reduction in required resources for the threshold-
control scheme is accomplished in Sec. 4: First, a classical
control of a quantum teleportation is discussed in Sec. 4.1.
Second, a control of a quantum teleportation using m qubits
for the controllers’ portion is introduced in Sec. 4.2. Third,
an economization of Bob’s operations is accomplished in Sec.
4.3. An explicit preparation of an initial state for this econ-
omized scheme is shown in Sec. 5 together with the opera-
tional complexity of the whole process. We discuss advan-
tages and disadvantages of the scheme in Sec. 6. Section 7
summarizes our results.
involving access structures.
2 A Standard Controlled Quantum
Teleportation
Consider a controlled quantum teleportation using (n − 1)
EPR pairs shared by Alice and Bob, and a single quantum
system shared by Alice, Bob, and m controllers. Alice tries
to send an n-qubit state
1...1∑
x1...xn=0...0
px1...xn |x1 . . . xn〉A′1...A′n
of the system A′ to Bob. A standard quantum teleporta-
tion protocol works fine for the (n − 1)-EPR-pair channel
consisting of (n−1) pairs A1B1, ...,An−1Bn−1. The remain-
ing channel, AnBn, is under the control of m controllers
C1, ...,Cm. The setup of the quantum system is illustrated
in Fig. 1. Here it should be noted that, although we consider
the control of a single channel here, it is straightforward to
attach controllers to each channel. Thus let us limit setups
to the illustrated one in the following. The initial state of
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Figure 1: Illustration of qudit sharing for a controlled quan-
tum teleportation.
the illustrated system is given by
|A′ABC〉 =
(
1...1∑
x1...xn=0...0
px1...xn |x1 . . . xn〉A′1...A′n
)
⊗
n−1⊗
l=1
1√
2
1∑
y
l
=0
|y
l
〉A
l
|y
l
〉B
l

⊗ |ξ〉AnBnC1...Cm
with
|ξ〉AnBnC1...Cm =
1√
2
1∑
y=0
|yy〉AnBn |κ(y)〉C1...Cm (1)
a shared state involving the controllers’ portion |κ(y)〉C1...Cm
to be engineered for a tailored controlling scheme.
Let us recall the well-known relation
|x, y〉 = 1√
2
1∑
i=0
(−1)x·i|Bi,x⊕y〉,
where |x, y〉 is a computational basis vector and |Bi,j〉 =
(1/
√
2)
∑1
x=0(−1)x·i|x, j⊕x〉 is the (i, j)th Bell basis vector
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(here, j = x⊕ y, i.e., y = j ⊕ x). With this relation, we can
rewrite the initial state as
|A′ABC〉
=
1
2n
∑
x1...xn
px1...xn
[(n−1⊗
l=1
1∑
il=0
1∑
j
l
=0
(−1)xl ·il
× |Bil,jl〉A′lAl |jl ⊕ xl〉Bl
)
⊗
( 1∑
in=0
1∑
jn=0
(−1)xn·in
× |Bin,jn〉A′nAn |jn ⊕ xn〉Bn |κ(jn ⊕ xn)〉C1...Cm
)]
.
(2)
As is usual for a standard quantum teleportation, Alice
makes Bell measurement on each (A′lAl) pair and obtains
an outcome (i
l
, j
l
).
Bob receives information {(i
l
, j
l
)} from Alice and applies⊗n−1
l=1 Z
ilXjl to B1...Bn−1. This changes the state of each
Bl (of each term in the summation) from (−1)xl ·il |jl ⊕xl〉Bl
to |x
l
〉Bl and hence the teleportation process for the original
state of A′ is completed up to l = n− 1.
To complete the recovery of the original state of A′ at
Bob’s side, he has to apply a certain operation to Bn. This
requires Bob to know the effect of controllers’ measurements
on |κ(jn ⊕ xn)〉C1...Cm . Operations Bob has to apply to Bn
depend on the controlling scheme.
A popular controlled quantum teleportation scheme
is the case where |κ(y)〉C1...Cm is set to |y . . . y〉C1...Cm ,
i.e., |ξ〉AnBnC1...Cm is set to a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) state, and each controller makes a measurement in
the X basis. Measuring Cs in the X basis results in the
phase factor (−1)y·(hs==−1) depending on the outcome hs
(here, s ∈ {1, ...,m}; the operation “==” returns one if its
two arguments are equal and zero otherwise)3. In this case,
Bob first applies ZinXjn to Bn. In addition, he applies a
single Z gate to Bn for recovery if the number of −’s in the
controllers’ outcomes (∈ ±) is odd. The final state of Bob
after these operations becomes
∑
x1...xn
px1...xn
⊗n
l=1 |xl〉Bl .
The teleportation is successful in this way.
In this contribution, we aim to introduce a threshold-
control scheme in which the shared state |ξ〉AnBnC1...Cm is
engineered to be different from the GHZ state. We continue
to concentrate on the case where only a single qubit of Bob
is under the control, as illustrated in Fig. 1; this is because
it is straightforward to extend the scheme so that multi-
ple qubits are under the control. Such an extension will be
considered only in Sec. 4.3.
3 (k,m)-Threshold Controlled
Quantum Teleportation
The functionality of threshold control is achieved by engi-
neering the initial setup of the shared state given by Eq.
3 This is because a computational basis state |c〉 of a qubit can
be written as |c〉 = 1√
2
P
h=+1,−1(−1)
c·(h==−1)|h〉 using the X-basis
states |h〉.
(1). Let us begin with a rather expensive scheme that is
a straightforward extension of a classical secret sharing. In
this scheme, the state of the controllers’ portion is assumed
to be in the following form
|κ(y)〉C1...Cm
=
1√
#S
∑
c1...cm∈S
eiyθ(c1...cm)|c1...cm〉C1...Cm , (3)
where y = jn⊕xn, cs ∈ {0, . . . , d−1} (s ∈ {1, ...,m} and d is
a positive integer), and S is a certain set of m-digit strings;
the computational basis for each Cs is chosen arbitrarily and
known by the sth controller. There are two conditions for
the state appropriate for a (k,m)-threshold scheme:
(i) θ(c1...cm) cannot be uniquely determined unless the se-
quence c1...cm is completely specified (i.e., unless the vari-
ables c1, ..., cm are all specified).
(ii) A string c1...cm is uniquely determined in S by fixing
any k digits of c1, ..., cm.
Under these conditions, k controllers’ measurements result
in a single surviving vector |c1...cm〉. Thus Bob can recover
the original state by the following process (in addition to
the usual process for the original quantum teleportation
for l = 1, ..., n − 1). First Bob changes the phase factor
eiyθ(c1...cm) to unity by applying(
1 0
0 e−iθ(c1...cm)
)
to the qubit Bn. Second Bob applies Z
inXjn to Bn as is
usual for a quantum teleportation. In these steps, Alice’s
Bell measurement on A′nAn prior to controllers’ measure-
ments does not affect Bob’s operation to recover the phase
appearing as a result of controllers’ measurements. This is
clear from the initial state described in Eq. (2); the parame-
ter y = jn⊕xn is common in the states of Bn and controllers’
portion.
Let us turn to a system construction for satisfying the
conditions. Condition (i) is satisfied by setting θ(c1...cm) =∑m
s=1 cspi/d. Such θ(c1...cm) cannot be uniquely determined
unless the variables c1, ..., cm are completely specified. A
quantum circuit to attach the phase factors is easily realized:
from s = 1 to m, applying an An-controlled Cs-controlled
phase gate with the phase cspi/d, acting on a work qubit
accomplishes this task. For the condition (ii), we will find
a proper set S of m-digit vectors c1...cm by a certain cod-
ing scheme. This is the main concern as the resource for
quantum information processing is limited in the current
technologies; a coding with a small resource is desirable.
We revisit the theory of Karnin et al. [24], which describes
a sufficient condition for coding in a threshold scheme, and
evaluate a polynomial-coding scheme [23, 26] as a typical
example.
We begin with a well-known property of a linear matrix
equation.
Proposition: A solvable matrix equation over
3
GF(p),
Ax = b
with p a prime number, A ∈ GF(p)f×g, x ∈
GF(p)g, and b ∈ GF(p)f has a unique solution
x if and only if f ≥ g and A has a full rank.
The proof is similar to the case of a real number field (see,
e.g., Ref. [36, pages 96,103]).
Proof— (i) First we prove that the solution x is unique if
f ≥ g and A has a full rank. Assume that there are two
solutions x1 and x2. Then, Ax1 = Ax2. Let us pick up
g rows of A appropriately to generate A˜ so that A˜ has a
full rank. This is possible because otherwise the number of
linearly independent row vectors of A should be less than g,
which is a contradiction. We have thus A˜x1 = A˜x2 with the
square full-rank matrix A˜. The matrix A˜ can be reduced to
a diagonal matrix with nonzero diagonal elements by basic
operations; thus detA˜ 6= 0. Consequently, x1 = x2 because
A˜−1 exists. This is a contradiction. (ii) Second we prove
that f ≥ g and A has a full rank if x is a unique solution.
The contraposition of this statement is that solution x is
not unique if f < g or rank A is less than min(f, g). This is
easily shown to be true. 
On the basis of this proposition, a coding of our interest
is achieved by a matrix equation for (f, g) = (m, k) with a
full-rank matrix A such that striking any (m−k) rows keeps
the rank full [24]. Given a matrix equation
Ax = (c1, . . . , cm)
t (4)
with such A which is notified to Bob, we prepare
|κ(y)〉C1...Cm as
|κ(y)〉C1...Cm
=
1√
#Sx
∑
c1...cm∈Sx
eiyθ(c1...cm)|c1 . . . cm〉C1...Cm
where Sx is a set of c1 . . . cm corresponding to x ∈ GF(p)k
(hence #Sx ≤ pk). Suppose that at least k controllers mea-
sure their qudits in the computational basis. Then x is fixed
uniquely because the matrix equation becomes solvable by
using the rows corresponding to the fixed cs’s. This implies
that the superposition is then resolved. Bob can determine
the phase factor that he should modify by receiving at least
k outcomes from controllers.
We have seen a common construction of a threshold
scheme. Required resources for the threshold scheme are
mostly dependent on the choice of the matrix A. There are
two practical ways among many [24, 25]. One is the matrix
in the form
A(i) = ( I | T )t
with I the k×k identity matrix and T a k× (m−k) strictly
totally positive matrix [37, 38]. Any minor of T is nonzero
positive from the definition of strict total positivity; hence
any k rows of A build up a square matrix with nonzero de-
terminant. Thus a matrix equation with A(i) can be used
for the threshold scheme. A drawback is the difficulty to
find a strictly totally positive matrix T for sufficiently small
prime p. A known systematic construction [39] for strictly
totally positive matrices uses the largest element of T grow-
ing exponentially in dim T . Thus p also grows exponentially
if we follow the construction. A manual optimization is in-
dispensable.
The other is a Vandermonde matrix used in the well-
known Shamir’s scheme [23],
A(ii) = Vm,k =

1 x1 x
2
1 · · · xk−11
1 x2 x
2
2 · · · xk−12
...
...
...
...
...
1 xm x
2
m · · · xk−1m
 mod p (5)
with mutually different xi’s with prime p > m−1. (p > m−1
is necessary to set xi’s mutually different.) Striking (m− k)
rows generates a square Vandermonde matrix and it is non-
singular when xi’s are mutually different (see, e.g., pages
43 and 219 of Ref. [40]). Hence a matrix equation with
A(ii) can be used for the threshold scheme. This matrix has
been known to be economical because p increases linearly
in m. Each qudit distributed to a controller should have
the dimension d ≥ p, consequently. Nevertheless, one may
need to further reduce the dimension considering the poor
resources of presently available qudit systems [35, 41].
4 Economizing the Threshold Con-
trol Scheme
The dimension of each digit distributed to a party (a con-
troller in the present context) is often evaluated by using the
scale of “bit length” in conventional secret sharing schemes.
Each key is O(logm)-bit long [23] (O(m)-bit long [30, 31])
in the best known protocols for a short secret with the bit
length O(logm) (for a long secret with the bit length O(m))
although this has not been taken as a drawback at all since
classical bits are very cheap. Nevertheless, in quantum pro-
tocols one should not consume many qubits for individual
quantum systems. It is of our concern to find a smaller di-
mension for each controller’s qudit facing a limited resource
of a quantum system.
One way is to abandon the use of quantum systems for
controllers’ portion and instead use a classical threshold
scheme to control a quantum teleportation. A controlled
teleportation proposed by Zhang and Man [33], in the con-
text of (m,m) threshold, uses classical keys shared by Alice
and controllers for encoding Alice’s messages, which can be
easily extended to a general threshold-control scheme. Here,
we introduce a different scheme where controllers’ qudits are
simply replaced by classical digits. We will face the fact that
classical control schemes are indeed economical but their se-
curity is based on classical keys. Using qudits is found to be
more robust against Bob’s physical-access attack.
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Our interest is to find such a robust scheme with a sim-
ple quantum state for the controllers’ portion. It is shown
to be constructed by using the matrix equation with the
Vandermonde matrix (5) and qubit states distributed to the
controllers. We further perform an economization in the
number of Bob’s operations, which is useful for an exten-
sion in which multiple EPR channels are under controllers’
control.
4.1 Classically-Controlled Quantum Tele-
portation
As we mentioned, the simplest way of economization is to
use classical control digits instead of quantum ones. This is
easily achieved by setting the state (not a state, actually) of
the controllers’ portion to be a scalar
|κ(y)〉C1...Cm = eiyθ(c1,...,cm)
with phase θ dependent on integers c1, ..., cm, the classical
keys of a certain classical threshold scheme. Bob can modify
this scalar factor by applying diag[1, e−iθ(c1,...,cm)] to his nth
qubit Bn if he can gather at least k of the keys.
The security of the scheme is dependent on the classical
scheme. Indeed, classical keys can be securely distributed
by using a quantum key distribution (see Ref. [42] and ref-
erences therein) and the risk of an interception during the
key distribution is negligible. Classical keys are, however,
easily copied by careless controllers. A possible drawback
of the scheme is that controllers cannot stop Bob from re-
covering Alice’s original state if Bob manages to obtain at
least k of the keys without consent of the controllers. In
contrast, in a threshold scheme using qudits, the operations
for a recovery of the original state are unfixed until k con-
trollers make measurements. This fact makes the quantum
one more robust: Recall that the computational basis for Cs
in Eq. (3) is not necessarily known in public. The correct
basis for a measurement can be left unknown to Bob. Then,
Bob cannot obtain cs by a physical access to Cs unless he
also has an access to the information on the measurement
basis. Thus the cost for Bob to steal cs’s in the scheme is
more than that in the classically controlled one. This logic is
similar to the one utilized for keeping the security of dealer-
player communications in some quantum threshold schemes
[32, 34].
It should be mentioned that robustness depends on the
type of protocol violations. Let us discuss a different type of
violation that can be made by Bob. It is a common occasion
that controllers do not want Bob to process further with a
teleported state before they officially vote for their decision.
A violation in this regard occurs when k or more controllers
are friendly to Bob and they measure their qudits or digits
and send the outcomes before the voting starts officially.
This violation in the schedule of the procedure cannot be
prevented even if qudits are distributed.
In the following, an economical quantum control scheme
is introduced in order to reduce the resource for controllers’
quantum system as we have mentioned. It is now our addi-
tional motivation to resolve the schedule violation problem
due to friendly controllers.
4.2 Economical Quantum Threshold-
Controlled Quantum Teleportation
As is discussed above, a quantum threshold scheme has a
classically unachievable property, namely that the opera-
tions for a recovery of the original state are unfixed until
controllers make measurements and the measurement bases
can be left unnotified to Bob. As we have mentioned, our
aim is to achieve such a scheme using small-dimensional sys-
tems for controllers’ portions. Here, we propose a quantum
protocol for the (k,m)-threshold controlled quantum tele-
portation with m qubits distributed to the controllers. It
also resolves the problem of the possible violation in the
voting schedule.
It is implemented with the following state for the con-
trollers’ portion:
|κ(y)〉C1...Cm
=
1√
2m
m⊗
s=1
[ei2piycs/p|0˜s〉+ ei2pi¬ycs/p|1˜s〉]Cs ,
(6)
where |0˜s〉 and |1˜s〉 are the basis vectors of the sth con-
troller’s chosen basis; ¬y is a logical negation of y and cs’s
are the keys of the following common classical polynomial-
coding threshold scheme. The keys are generated from
Eq. (4) using a Vandermonde matrix for A and a certain
fixed vector for x [all the matrix and vector elements are in
GF(p)]. The matrix A is notified to Bob and x is hidden.
Thus k or more keys are required for Bob to determine the
remaining keys from Eq. (4).
The protocol imposed to controllers is as follows.
(I) Each controller Cs,agree who agrees to allow Bob to re-
cover Alice’s original state measures her/his qubit in the
basis {|0˜s〉, |1˜s〉} and sends its outcome rs ∈ {0, 1} to Bob.
(II) Cs,agree also sends her/his key cs to Bob.
(III) Each controller Cs,disagree who disagrees to allow Bob
to recover Alice’s original state does not make any action
until she/he receives a contact from Bob.
(IV) When a solicit is sent from Bob, Cs,disagree must mea-
sure her/his qubit in the basis {|0˜s〉, |1˜s〉} and send its out-
come rs ∈ {0, 1} to Bob.
The protocol imposed to Bob is as follows.
(i) Bob receives (i
l
, j
l
)’s from Alice. Bob applies⊗n−1
l=1 Z
ilXjl to B1...Bn−1.
(ii) Bob waits for at least k pairs of (rs, cs)’s sent from the
controllers.
(iii) Bob calculates the remaining cs’s by substituting the
obtained cs’s into Eq. (4) if at least k pairs are obtained;
aborts otherwise.
(iv) Bob sends solicits to the controllers who did not send
information to him.
Note: it is possible to count his solicits. Therefore, he can-
not cheat by sending more than (m−k) solicits in this stage
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even when he succeeds in stealing k or more cs’s beforehand.
(v) Bob receives the remaining rs’s.
(vi) Bob modifies the phase factor due to controllers’ mea-
surements in his phase recovery process described below.
(vii) Bob applies ZinXjn to Bn.
Bob’s phase recovery process corresponding to the
controllers’ measurements— The m controllers’ mea-
surements (of course, after Alice’s Bell measurements) make
the component state for A′nAnBnC1...Cm in Eq. (2), with
the controllers’ state (6) in the present context, evolve into
the state
1∑
y=jn⊕xn=0
(−1)xn·in |Bin,jn〉A′nAn |y〉Bn |κ˜(y)〉C1...Cm
with
|κ˜(y)〉C1...Cm
=
1√
2m
m⊗
s=1
exp[i2pi(¬)rsycs/p]|rs〉Cs .
The phase factor∏
s
exp[i2pi(¬)rsycs/p]
should be canceled by Bob before the normal recovery op-
eration is performed in step (vii). The cancellation of the
factor with probability one is possible if and only if all the
controllers follow the protocol and at least k of them send
cs’s to Bob (otherwise he will get an uncertain state as his
operations become a guesswork). Since cs’s are classical keys
of a (k,m) threshold scheme, k or more of them are neces-
sary and sufficient to find out all of them. Bob can eliminate
the phase by applying∏
s
diag[exp(−i2pirscs/p), exp(−i2pi¬rscs/p)] (7)
to his nth qubit Bn. This operation is unaffected by Alice’s
Bell measurement on A′nAn as is clear from the initial state
described in Eq. (2).
In this way, the (k,m)-threshold control is realized by us-
ing only qubit systems for individual portions. One may
notice that it is a hybrid scheme in the sense that the (k,m)
threshold is realized by a classical threshold scheme. Al-
though classical keys are used, we claim that this scheme
possesses a property thanks to a quantum control; the re-
covery operations are unfixed unless all the controllers make
measurements, and the measurement bases are unknown to
Bob. The measurements are not completely performed un-
less there are at least k Cs,agree’s and Bob sends at most
(m − k) solicits to Cs,disagree’s. Hence, in order to cheat
under the protocol, Bob needs to collect cs’s, qubits, and
measurement bases of at least k controllers.
The scheme has an advantage over the previously-
introduced quantum scheme in the sense that it is secure
against the possible schedule violation due to friendly con-
trollers. Owing to step (IV), Bob has to wait for an official
voting time to obtain Alice’s original state unless the con-
trollers violate the voting schedule all together.
4.3 Economization in Bob’s Operations
We have shown an economized quantum (or hybrid) con-
trolled quantum teleportation using the state (6) for the con-
trollers’ portion, in which the dimension of each distributed
qudit has been reduced to two. As two is the minimal di-
mension for a nontrivial quantum system, it is optimized
with respect to the dimension of a Hilbert space of each
portion. Here we consider an economization of Bob’s opera-
tions to eliminate the phase factor coming from controllers’
measurements.
The number of Bob’s single-qubit operations for the re-
covery is not important as far as a single EPR channel is
under the controllers’ control because Eq. (7) reduces to a
single operation. It is, however, not negligible in case we ex-
tend the setup to the one illustrated in Fig. 2, in which we
may have multiple shared states. Each controller is assigned
to a single AlBl pair and the total number of controllers is
m.
A
n Bn
C
1
C
m
A
1
A
n-1
Bell Measurements
...
B
1
B
n-1
...
A
n
A
1
A
n-1
...
Alice Bob
Controllers
...
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 2: A straightforward extension of the system setup
shown in Fig. 1, such that controllers are assigned to mul-
tiple channels. Each AlBl pair is not necessarily under the
supervision of controllers.
Let us use the same state as in Eq. (6), except the labels
of controllers, for each of the controllers’ portions (repre-
sented by dotted lines inside the square of “Controllers”
in Fig. 2). We change the protocol for controllers in the
following way.
(A) A controller who Agrees to allow Bob to recover the
original state makes a measurement on her/his qubit in the
basis {|+˜s〉, |−˜s〉} with |±˜s〉 = |0˜s〉 ± |1˜s〉. She/he sends
Bob the outcome us ∈ {+˜, −˜} together with cs.
(D) A controller who Disagrees does not make any action.
However when a solicit is sent from Bob, a controller who
Disagrees must make a measurement on her/his qubit in
the basis {|0˜s〉, |1˜s〉} and send Bob the outcome vs ∈ {0, 1}.
To understand the effect of a measurement, let us decom-
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pose each component of the state (6) in the following way:
1√
2
[ei2piycs/p|0˜s〉+ei2pi¬ycs/p|1˜s〉]
=
1
2
√
2
[
(ei2piycs/p + ei2pi¬ycs/p)|+˜s〉
+ (ei2piycs/p − ei2pi¬ycs/p)|−˜s〉
]
.
First consider the case (A).
(A-i) Suppose that the outcome of a measurement by the
sth controller is +˜. Then, the unnormalized phase factor
owing to this measurement is
ei2piycs/p + ei2pi¬ycs/p = 1 + ei2pics/p,
which is a global phase uncorrelated with y. Thus Bob does
not have to modify it.
(A-ii) Suppose that the outcome of a measurement by the
sth controller is −˜. Then, the unnormalized phase factor
owing to this measurement is ei2piycs/p − ei2pi¬ycs/p, which
can be regarded as{
α (y = 0)
−α (y = 1)
with α = 1 − ei2pics/p. Thus Bob can modify the factor by
applying Z to some Bl for which the controller’s qubit is
originally connected in Fig. 2.
Second consider the case (D).
The phase factor due to the measurement, with the outcome
vs ∈ {0, 1}, is exp[i2pi(¬)vsycs/p]. This can be modified by
applying
diag[exp(−i2pivscs/p), exp(−i2pi¬vscs/p)]
to a proper Bl, which is possible if Bob knows cs, namely, if
k or more controllers follow (A).
In addition to the above recovery of the phase factors
corresponding to controllers’ measurements, Bob applies
ZilXjl to each Bl, as usual, to recover the phase factors
corresponding to Alice’s Bell measurements.
Let us estimate the reduction in the number of operations
that Bob has to apply to Bl’s for eliminating the phase fac-
tors due to controllers’ measurements. Let us consider the
worst case where the m controllers are assigned to mutually
different channels. In our previous protocol, the number
of the operations is m. In the present protocol, it is, on
average, t/2 + (m− t) = m− t/2 with t the number of con-
trollers who agree to allow Bob to recover the original state.
(Of course, Bob cannot recover the state when t < k.)
5 Operational Complexity
In the previous section, a quantum (or hybrid) (k,m)-
threshold controlled quantum teleportation using qubits
(without qudits whose dimension is more than two) has been
constructed. We will count the number of single-qubit op-
erations and that of two-qubit operations by following the
whole process. Here, we consider the case where the con-
trollers are attached to the nth EPR channel AnBn and
regard Bob’s recovery operation corresponding to each con-
troller’s measurement as a single operation, for simplicity.
The number of operations is unchanged by employing the
setup illustrated in Fig. 2.
The process is the same as the original quantum telepor-
tation [1] except for the measurements and operations acting
on the shared state of AnBnC1...Cm, as we have seen in Sec.
2.
For the part without controllers in Fig. 1, there are (n−1)
EPR pairs prepared between Alice and Bob. The quan-
tum circuit for preparing the EPR states involves (n − 1)
Hadamard gates and the same number of controlled-NOT
(CNOT) gates. Alice makes (n − 1) Bell measurements
between the system A′1...A
′
n−1 and the system A1...An−1
and sends the outcomes (i
l
, j
l
) as classical information to
Bob. Bob applies 2(n− 1) single-qubit operations at most,
namely,
⊗n−1
l=1 Z
ilXjl , according to the classical information
received from Alice.
For the portion of the shared state in the figure, the initial
state
1√
2
1∑
y=0
|yy〉AnBn |κ(y)〉C1...Cm
with |κ(y)〉C1...Cm given by Eq. (6) should be prepared. It
is prepared as follows. First we produce the state
1√
2
1∑
y=0
|yy〉AnBn ⊗
m⊗
s=1
|0˜s〉Cs .
This is easily prepared by a single Hadamard gate and a
CNOT gate acting on AnBn. The state |0˜s〉Cs is a ba-
sis vector in the sth controller’s favorite basis. Second, m
Hadamard gates are applied to C1...Cm individually in their
bases. In addition, the operation
diag[1, exp(i2pics/p), exp(i2pics/p), 1]
is applied to AnCs for all s ∈ {1, ...,m} in the basis
{|0〉, |1〉}An ⊗ {|0˜s〉, |1˜s〉}Cs . The desired initial state for
AnBnC1...Cm is now achieved. In the teleportation stage,
Alice makes a Bell measurement on A′nAn and sends Bob
the outcome (in, jn). The controllers and Bob follow the
protocol as described in Sec. 4.2 or that in Sec. 4.3. In
this process, Bob can eliminate the phase factors due to
controllers’ measurements if k or more controllers agree to
allow Bob to obtain the original state. Finally, Bob applies
ZinXjn to Bn. After all these steps, he obtains the original
state of A′1...A
′
n in B1...Bn.
With the above description of the process, we find that the
number of single-qubit operations and that of two-qubit op-
erations for preparing the initial state of the whole system
are n + m for both operations. The teleportation process
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involves n Bell measurements performed by Alice and m
single-qubit measurements performed by controllers. It also
involves Bob’s recovery operations: (i) at most 2n single-
qubit operations corresponding to Alice’s measurement out-
comes; (ii) m single qubit operations [on average, (m− t/2)
single-qubit operations] corresponding to controllers’ mea-
surement outcomes when the protocol described in Sec. 4.2
is employed [when that in Sec. 4.3 is employed].
In addition, as we have mentioned in Sec. 4.3, the oper-
ations of (ii) reduce to a single operation in reality for the
present setup while it does not for the setup of Fig. 2.
6 Discussions
We have proposed an economical scheme for a (k,m)-
threshold control of a quantum teleportation. It uses a
shared state of Alice, Bob, and controllers with the con-
trollers’ portion in the state of Eq. (6), which consists of
qubits only. Thus a drawback of a usual polynomial cod-
ing, namely, the required dimension d ≥ p > m − 1 for
each controller’s qudit, has been resolved. In addition, it is
straightforward to extend the scheme so that multiple qubits
in Bob’s portion are under the threshold control.
Our economical scheme can be seen as a hybrid of a stan-
dard (m,m)-threshold controlled quantum teleportation and
a (k,m)-threshold classically-controlled quantum teleporta-
tion, as we have mentioned in Sec. 4.2. It should be noted
that this has been realized by a nontrivial protocol using
the state (6). The scheme has a good redundancy for the
securement of the (k,m) threshold: (i) To modify the phase
factors owing to controllers’ measurements, k or more clas-
sical keys are required for Bob. (ii) To make disagreeing
controllers perform measurements, at most (m − k) solicits
should be sent from Bob. In fact, the standard controlled
teleportation in the context of (m,m) threshold can be used
in the context of (k,m) threshold by stating only (ii) in its
protocol. The advantage of our economical scheme over this
simple extension is, thus, the redundant securement.
The scheme is, however, not as economical as a classically-
controlled quantum teleportation, as we have discussed in
Sec. 4.1. A quantum threshold-control scheme is certainly
more expensive than a classical threshold-control scheme. It
is thus recommended to assess the trade-off between the ben-
efit and the economicalness to choose an appropriate scheme.
The benefit to distribute qudits (qubits in our scheme)
among controllers is to make the recovery operation of Bob
unfixed unless controllers make measurements. This makes
the protocol robust against Bob’s attack to the keys: In
order for cheating, he needs both physical accesses to at least
k controllers’ qudits and information on their measurement
bases. One may however claim that careless controllers tend
to lose both of them at once in a real world. Our economical
scheme possesses a clearer advantage also: it can prevent a
violation of a voting schedule, i.e. it can prevent Bob from
recovering the original state before an official voting time,
unless controllers violate the schedule all together.
There is one drawback in our protocol. In case we use the
scheme of Sec. 3, controllers who disagree to the telepor-
tation do not have to measure their systems. In contrast,
in our economical protocol, a disagreeing controller has to
measure her/his qubit if a solicit is sent from Bob. Our pro-
tocol can be broken by a controller who does not follow this
regulation. It seems an important drawback at a glance,
but there is a quick solution: one can easily find out which
controller cheats in the protocol. Any controller who does
not send a measurement outcome despite a solicit sent from
noncheating Bob is a cheater.
A clever cheater, however, may report an opposite mea-
surement outcome and/or a wrong key instead of being
quiet. It has been well-known that a basic secret sharing is
not robust against dishonest participants who report wrong
keys. There have been several proposals to remedy this
drawback in classical secret sharing schemes [43, 44, 45, 46].
These classical schemes are easily combined into our scheme
in order to find cheating in the keys cs, as is clear from the
protocol. Nevertheless, a protocol to find cheaters sending
wrong messages as measurement outcomes should be newly
constructed. One way to achieve this task is to add a su-
percontroller who grasps controllers’ states by entangling
her/his systems and their corresponding systems. Let the
supercontroller know their measurement bases. Then the
supercontroller can check the measurement outcomes after-
ward. It is hoped that a more sophisticated way will be
developed.
Finally, we discuss a well-known strategy to use controlled
quantum teleportation as a secret sharing to hide a quan-
tum state as a secret [7]. Any (k,m)-threshold controlled
quantum teleportation in the stage after Alice’s Bell mea-
surements is regarded as a (k,m)-threshold quantum secret
sharing: Alice’s original state to be recovered in Bob’s side
is regarded as a secret and the controllers are regarded as
participants sharing the secret. A drawback of this approach
is that the original state is recovered in the system of Bob’s
side; participants who try to cooperate for recovery should
gather at this side or ask a dealer for proxy.
A solution to avoid this drawback is to construct m
initially identical copies of the entire system K for the
(k,m)-threshold controlled quantum teleportation, where
K = A′1A1...A
′
nAnB1...BnC1...Cm. Let us write a copy as
Ku = A′
u
1A
u
1 ...A
′u
nA
u
nB
u
1 ...B
u
nC
u
1 ...C
u
m with u ∈ {1, ...,m}.
We send the system Bv1 ...B
v
n, together with classical in-
formation obtained by the Bell measurements on each of
A′
v
1A
v
1, ...,A
′v
nA
v
n, to the vth participant (v ∈ {1, ...,m}).
The vth participant should also receive C1v, ...,C
m
v , namely
the vth control systems of all Ku’s. The vth participant
can recover the original state in the system Bv1...B
v
n when
she/he gets to know the measurement results on k or more
among Cv1, ...,C
v
m, including her/his own, and corresponding
classical keys if they are used in the scheme.
This approach possesses the following benefit. The orig-
inal quantum secret sharing is limited to m < 2k − 1 due
to the no-cloning theorem when an unknown quantum state
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is a secret [26]. A controlled quantum teleportation with
a (k,m)-threshold control is not limited by the no-cloning
theorem because the secret, namely, Alice’s original state, is
teleported to Bob’s system. The approach is practical when
we use classical keys for controlling a quantum teleporta-
tion. The resource required for this case is m classical keys
and m copies of the system that consists of n EPR pairs
and the n-qubit original state. Of course, the m copies of
the system are reduced to one copy in case participants may
gather in a particular place or may use a trusted dealer for
proxy.
There seems to be no serious drawback of using classical
control because the classical keys can be securely distributed
and a scheduled vote is not interposed usually for a secret
sharing. The robustness of our economical scheme is effec-
tive when an untrusted Bob exists. This is due to the fact
that the measurement basis of each controller can be hid-
den. In this sense, our economical scheme might be used
for a secret sharing to build in robustness against physical
access attacks by malicious participants who try to cheat.
Nevertheless, it is not attractive to spend many EPR pairs
despite the reduction in the resource for controllers’ portion.
A choice of a proper scheme is dependent on the demand of
participants when a controlled quantum teleportation is ap-
plied to a secret sharing.
We have discussed the advantage and disadvantage of our
scheme in which the dimension of each controller’s qudit
is reduced to two. This reduction is indeed significant for
physical realization of the threshold control of a quantum
teleportation. Nevertheless, it is controversial as to which
extent a controlled quantum teleportation should be per-
formed with quantum resources. The answer depends on
the application and as to which party is trusted, as is clear
from the above discussions.
7 Summary
We have proposed an economical protocol for (k,m)-
threshold controlled quantum teleportation. This proto-
col uses qubits distributed to controllers; hence we have
achieved the reduction in the dimension of each qudit from
a prime p > m − 1 to two. In addition, we have shown an
economization in the number of Bob’s recovery operations.
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